for helpful discussions, comments, criticisms, and/or suggestions over the long gestation of this project, in some cases offered without realizing or expecting we might use some benign remark in this way.
the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament (33). Our contribution at this philosophical level is decidedly modest. We merely suggest the empirical and theoretical utility of viewing the range of potential bases of representation as some continuum extending from pure representation of interests defined by the electoral district, d, or geographic representation, to pure representation of the set of interests supporting the party, p, or partisan representation. In defining the latter extreme, notice, we have already made two implicit assumptions. First, we imply that the broadest interest a representative might serve would reflect a partisan (i.e., still partial) conception of the national interest. Second, we also assume that partisan representation subsumes interest, ideology, and identity-group representation.
1 Conceiving the possibilities thus, the positive question becomes what determines the relative weight of these polar modes of representation in any particular political system. On this point, we acknowledge and discuss the potential impact of several factors, including district-and national-level electoral competitiveness, partisan polarization, and various other features of electoral and party systems, but focus for now on the degree to which parties are able to act as strategic units and receive electoral support as units, i.e., of party unity, u, as a useful summary statistic. We develop this argument further below, but, granting it for introductory purposes, it implies that the effective constituency, c, to which a policymaker responds is some convex combination of her electoral district and her party with the relative partisan weight increasing in party unity, for example:
This effective-constituency conceptualization arises from our attempts to explore the 1 One could imagine theoretically-informed empirical specifications that could model effective constituencies with four end-points reflecting national, party, social-identity group, or district interests. We leave such an extension for future research.
2 The for example is important: theory does not necessarily specify that the convex combination is a simple linear weighted-average; the suggested empirical methods can easily incorporate other combinatorial forms.
comparative empirical predictions of the Weingast-Shepsle-Johnsen (1981: WSJ ) model of distributive politics and pork-barrel spending (i.e., the law of 1/n), and its implications are perhaps most clearly seen in that specific theoretical and substantive context. WSJ demonstrate that, under certain conditions reviewed below, overemphasis of distributive politics, in general, and pork-barrel overspending, in particular, increase with the number of constituencies. WSJ do not, however, distinguish electoral districts from constituencies, and they define distributive politics and pork-barrel spending very narrowly, creating two mutually reinforcing problems for the comparative empiricist. First, data matching the precision with which the theory distinguishes pork-barrel/distributive from other spending/politics do not exist. Indeed, all politics and spending likely reflect some (varying) degree of distribution, redistribution, public-good provision, and rent seeking. Second, policymakers will likely exhibit varying responsiveness across different democratic settings to their electoral districts relative to myriad other potential constituencies they might serve. Moreover, these two issues are inseparable because the definition of distributive spending hinges on identification of the politically-relevant constituencies, and, conversely, the number of relevant constituencies depends on the policy at issue. To escape this dilemma, we suggest broader conceptions both of distributive spending and of the constituencies policy-relevant thereto. From there, extending WSJ s logic is exceedingly straightforward yet offers considerable gains in empirical "testability" and theoretical and substantive insight.
We structure the paper to make these points thus. We first briefly review the simplest WSJ model of distributive politics and pork-barrel spending. Cursory consideration of comparative work on distributive politics and of postwar-average public-spending in developed democracies then suffices to suggest strongly that the narrow definitions of distributive porkbarrel politics and policies and of constituencies as districts produce empirically inaccurate and theoretically problematic predictions. Next, we offer our proposed solution and discuss several complementary, alternative, or simply additional considerations. The penultimate section explains how we use the US postwar history of public-spending and politics to evalu-ate our argument, conducts the analysis, and discusses results. We conclude by returning to the broader issues of representation mentioned above, and considering extensions of the basic effective-constituencies concept beyond partisan and geographic bases of representation.
"The Political Economy of Costs and Benefits" Reviewed and Reconsidered
WSJ ask why representative legislatures routinely pass budgets that manifestly over-emphasize distributive, or pork-barrel spending, projects. Their answer stresses the division of democratic polities into electoral districts, noting that democratic representation everywhere is based on "a districting mechanism that divides the economy into n disjoint political units called districts" (p. 643), and defining "distributive policy [as] a political decision that concentrates benefits in a specific geographic constituency and finances expenditures through generalized taxation" (p. 644). They thus isolate geographic location as the distinguishing characteristic of distributive policies and politics: "Programs and projects are geographically targeted, geographically fashioned, and may be independently varied" (p. 644). Given these definitions, and assuming legislators follow some log-rolling or universalistic norm, WSJ demonstrate that overemphasis on distributive policies, i.e., overspending on pork-barrel projects, is an increasing function of the number of electoral districts.
To be precise, first, index the n electoral district i ∈ [1 . . . n]. Then, assume benefits, B, of any particular pork-barrel project concentrate in district i (for analytic clarity: entirely so) and increase with the size or cost of the project, B i = f (C), which, with diminishing returns, gives f < 0 and f < 0 as usual. By definition of a distributive policy, the costs accrue more uniformly across all n districts (for analytic clarity: entirely so):
. The individual district then faces a utility-maximization problem, M ax c f (C) − C/n, for which the solution is simply f (C) = 1 n . The optimal project-size from the individual districts view thus increases in the number of districts.
If legislatures decide democratically, without log-rolling, universalist norms, or sidepayments, then all pork-barrel projects lose legislative votes (n − 1) to 1 because only receiving districts derive net benefits, f (C) − C n , while others only pay costs, C n . WSJ argue, contrarily, that legislators could adopt a universalistic norm where all legislators vote for distributive bills ("I'll vote for yours; you vote for mine"), implying the legislature passes the district-by-district optimal, leaving pork-barrel spending proportional to the number of districts. Riker (1962) shows, however, that optimal coalition-building strategies in majority-rule legislatures involve side-payments sufficient to induce bare-majority support (minimum-winning coalitions) for distributive projects, meaning
other legislators must receive C n + ε, which also implies overemphasis on pork proportional to the number of districts, albeit more marginally so. Specifically, under universalism, all projects with B > C n pass, whereas under majority-rule with side-payments, only projects with B > [
] · C pass.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
Later scholarship, though, deduced several reasons super-majoritarianism may indeed govern legislative decision-making. Shepsle and Weingast (1981) , e.g., note that, given uncertainty over membership of minimum-winning coalitions, legislators prefer supermajorities to insure against their omission. Luebbert (1986) and Strom (1990) argue similarly regarding parliamentary government formation that, with uncertainty over legislative support, which, e.g., secret balloting or lack of party discipline may induce, coalition builders would seek supermajorities. Others stress that legislative procedures affect optimal-coalition size. Carruba and Volden (2000) show that, in fact, all coalitions from minimum-winning to universal may form depending on amendment openness and other procedural rules. For example, Baron (1991) (Axelrod 1984) . Furthermore, voters' rational ignorance also facilitates the side-payment arrangements that forge super-majorities behind distributive policies because legislators will demand smaller payments to support others' distributive proposals the greater is their voters' ignorance. In the limit, rational ignorance revives universalist scenarios wherein distributive projects maximize pork-barrel benefits district-bydistrict. Moreover, the total size of distributive inefficiencies or side-payment excesses about which voters may rationally remain ignorant also rises with the number of districts over which such costs distribute. Thus, distributive politics generally and pork-barrel spending specifically increase with the number of districts, more strongly so as legislative behavior tends more universalistic and less minimum-winning, which tendency, in turn, heightens as rational ignorance, winning-coalition uncertainty, or legislative-rule closure to amendment or veto rises.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
The logic is elegant, intuitive, and profound; unfortunately, the comparative evidence, logic suggests that the UK should exhibit distributive, i.e., district-focused, politics most prominently, followed closely by the US, and more distantly by Italy. Students of comparative developed-democratic politics would generally agree to the contrary that the actual ranking is probably the US, followed closely or possibly preceded by Italy, with the UK a distant last. Regarding the agencies with separate accounting (e.g., social security); using central-government data makes no substantive difference. For effectively bicameral countries, we average numbers of districts (total, all tiers) in each house.
For unicameral countries, we use numbers of districts in the primary house (total, all tiers). We consider the US, Japan, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Australia effectively bicameral for these purposes. The substance of these results, however, seemed independent of how we treated second chambers and of minor permutations in the set of countries considered bicameral. Alternative approaches to multiple-tier systems also altered little. 4 Omitting the UK or otherwise transforming the highly skewed ED (e.g., ln(ED)), does not help. In fact, as one can discern visually, as one trims countries from the large-ED end of the sample, these relationships become more negative.
UK, Rose (1986) In the US, meanwhile, district-oriented politics certainly plays a much larger role than in the UK and perhaps even than in Italy, though also perhaps less "clientelistically" so.
The contributions to Bogdanor (1985) contain more case-studies that may be relevant. In future work, we
Thus, discrepancy between theory and comparative evidence is wide and seems not to derive from deficient methodology or controls. 6 Contrarily, Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 2001 ) find support in comparing US states; Levitt and Snyder (1995) find indirect support in the pattern by spending category of partisan effects on the district distribution of US spending; Lee (1998 Lee ( , 2000 finds US Senate malapportionment to affect distributive politics consistently with the law of 1/n; Alvarez and Saving (1997) find that US Representatives do derive electoral benefits from spending in their districts; and Bickers and Stein (1996) find that US district spending increases with challenger quality. In our view, these conflicting results do not suggest that the 1 n logic only applies in the US; rather, they highlight an important substantive problematic that WSJ and many others (e.g., Burke) ignore: namely, conflation of the theoretical constituency with the empirical electoral district.
"The Effective Number of Constituencies" Concept
WSJ 's law of 1 n equates the physical boundaries of electoral districts with the conceptual borders of constituencies. We suggest that one instead conceive the number of constituencies in a political system as lying on a continuum with only one of its endpoints, that corresponding to pure geographic representation, at the number of electoral districts. Representative policymakers certainly may see themselves as representing and so act legislatively in the interests of their electoral districts, implying identity of constituencies and districts. At the other extreme, however, they may view themselves and act legislatively as representatives of the entire nation, as, e.g., presidents often claim, implying that only one constituency, the nation, exists. More realistically, executives or legislators may be pure partisan actors, representing the interests and ideologies of their party's supporters, which equates effective hope to use these for a broader comparative-empirical study of the nature of representation and distributive politics. Where along this range lies the effective number of constituencies that will be represented in government policy is a function, we contend, of the degree of party unity in the UK.
To clarify the intuition behind this contention, imagine varying the degree of party unity in the UK. The more apt is a unitary-actor characterization of the parties, the more an individual MP's legislative behavior is given by her party label. 8 This being so, voters will also choose party-labels more than individual MPs. Therefore, individual MPs neither act as independent legislative actors nor have much to gain by abandoning party unity to make some localistic appeal in their electoral districts. Partisan constituencies come to the fore. Conversely, the party label becomes less meaningful as the independence of MPs as legislative actors increases. Absent meaningful policy-labels, both as electoral draws and as prescriptions for legislative behavior, individual MP's electoral districts become more relevant to them and constituency service (including distributive projects) becomes more important to them and their supporters. Thus, the 651 electoral-district constituencies become more dominant.
7 To complete the example, if the Senate completely controlled policy and each Senator acted solely as a representative of her district, there would be 50 effective constituencies. 8 We will be using party unity as an empirical summary statistic, so we need neither assume it nor endogenize it theoretically here.
Therefore, the UK's effective number of constituencies lies between 651 and 1, with the extremes reflecting perfect party-disunity (i.e., legislative and electoral irrelevance of party label) and perfect party-unity (i.e., legislative and electoral irrelevance of any individual MP or district characteristics). More fully, effective constituencies lie on a continuum from pure partisan-to pure geographic-representation, therefore a convex combination of the numbers of governing parties, p, and electoral districts, d, gives the effective number of constituencies, c, in a political system, and the relative weight of p increases with the degree of party unity, u, characterizing that system. We adopt the simplest possible convex-combination, a linear weighted-average:
Given any two countries with nearly equal numbers of parties and electoral districts, therefore, more (fewer) effective constituencies exist in the system with lesser (greater) partyunity. Thus, distributive politics may be much more prominent in the US than UK, despite their roughly equal numbers of governing parties (1 − 2) and electoral districts (435 − 651), because British parties exhibit far greater party unity, making the UK's effective number of constituencies radically lower.
Applying our conceptualization to the 1 n logic of distributive politics and pork-barrel spending is exceedingly straightforward. First, redefine distributive policies as those that concentrate benefits within a single effective constituency but spread costs more evenly across all constituencies. Then, "distributive overemphasis and pork-barrel overspending" so defined increase with the number of effective constituencies rather than districts. A trivial corollary is important to the empirics evaluating this re-conceptualization below: holding constant the numbers of parties and of electoral districts, distributive politics and spending decrease with party unity. Before proceeding, however, we conduct several further thoughtexperiments to illustrate how effective numbers of constituencies depend on considerations beyond numbers of electoral districts and governing parties and degrees of party unity.
Consider, for instance, two hypothetical UKs, each with 2 parties, 651 electoral districts, and the same degree of party unity. These two UKs, however, differ in the ideological distance between their 2 parties. For concreteness, think of party ideologies on a single leftright dimension; in one of these UKs, the left and right parties are closer together than in the other. We expect the UK with the more-distinct party-ideologies to appeal less to the porkbarrel precisely because electoral competition in that UK will be more ideological. In the polarized UK, representatives and candidates compete to considerable degree on ideologicalpartisan bases as members of two opposing teams. In the UK with little ideological distance between parties, conversely, electoral competition has less ideological content. There being no broader "team" on which to base competition, distributive politics comes forward in the UK with less partisan-polarization, so it will exhibit relatively more distributive spending.
The Irish party system may exemplify a case of such relative absence of ideological conflict between the parties (on economic dimensions) fostering greater emphasis on distributive politics.
9
Electoral competitiveness of the districts may also enter. Imagine two other hypothetical UKs, each with 2 parties, 651 districts, and the same degrees of party unity and of partisan ideological polarization. One UK, however, has 651 competitive electoral districts while the other has 651 uncompetitive districts. I.e., all districts in the competitive UK have either Labour or Tory expecting a 51% to 49% victory; in the uncompetitive UKs districts, either Tory or Labour expects a 100% to 0% victory. If voters reward pork-barrel district projects with votes, both parties will have greater incentives to allow their candidates to promise, and their MPs to deliver, district projects and services in the more competitive UK.
Moreover, in the district-competitive UK, distributive overemphasis increases with nationallevel competitiveness (i.e., the closeness of the expected balance of seats in parliament) also because winning a marginal district is more critical. Thus, distributive politics and pork-barrel spending increase with electoral competitiveness.
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Notice the similarity of the role of partisan polarization and electoral non-competitiveness in dampening distributive-policy incentives to the role of party unity, u, in the effective 9 We thank Anne Wren for describing the Irish case to us in these terms. 10 We thank Andrea Bassanini and Carles Boix for emphasizing this consideration to us. constituencies defined above: c = u · p + (1 − u) · d. As party unity, partisan ideologicalproximity, and/or electoral competitiveness decline, electoral districts weigh more in determining effective constituencies. One could, therefore, replace the constant u in this heuristic model with a function reflecting the factors that push democratically elected policymaking to represent more their partisan than their geographic constituencies. These factors would include party unity (or, alternatively, some set of conditions that induce it) but also partisan polarization, ρ, and electoral competitiveness, e. The new heuristic would be similarly to district-level electoral-competitiveness.
In sum, we are suggesting most fully that (a) the degree to which parties are able to act as units should determine the capacity of democratic policymakers to budgeteer, (b) national and district-level electoral competitiveness should determine the magnitude of their incentives to budgeteer, and (c) party-system polarization, electoral-system and district magnitude, and the degree to which parties receive their electoral support as units should determine the nature of the budgeteering, the relative shares of partisan-redistributive and geographic-distributive policies, that they will pursue. We do not dispute the validity of exclusively in the US. However, whereas numbers of US electoral districts hardly changed postwar, providing almost no leverage to test the pure-electoral-district WSJ model directly with aggregate US data, and whereas governing-party numbers also held relatively constant, party unity varied sufficiently and measurably across time (see, e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993) to yield empirical leverage on our effective-constituency concept. 13 Thus, our conceptualization offers a practical testability benefit at least. Even so, using just one country severely limits empirical leverage (degrees of freedom) because dependent variables (taxation and expenditure components) are annual, and they and certain controls are unavailable until 1956.
Second, we must decide whether and how to distinguish distributive from other categories of spending and whether to measure such activity as a share of GDP or of total public 13 We thank John Ferejohn for thus suggesting US historical data as a test-bed for our ideas.
activity. Having defined distributive policies broadly as those that spread costs across while concentrating benefits within particular constituencies, not necessarily in particular electoral districts, all but the most universal of public goods may count as distributive. Accordingly, one measure of distributive spending is simply government final-consumption expenditure.
However, some spending-types are harder to target to as specifically as others, so we still want to retain some emphasis on distributive as opposed to redistributive spending or, in
Persson and Tabellini's (2000) useful terminology, special-interest from general-interest politics. Thus, our other spending measure is non-transfers spending. We acknowledge expressly that the relative weakness of these measures as dependent variables that match precisely our theoretical conception of distributive spending implies that we must view the results to follow as highly preliminary indeed.
The model's emphasis on overspending, moreover, might as easily suggest a focus on the share of the budget or of GDP spent on distributive projects. Rather than decide, we use final consumption and nontransfers spending as shares of GDP and of total spending 14 simultaneously, thus mildly alleviating the limited-degrees-of-freedom problem. By jointly estimating a set of four equations, each regressing a spending measure on several controls and a variable capturing our conception of the effective number of constituencies, we gain leverage. Even if we apply no cross-equation restrictions on estimated coefficients, residual correlation across regressions offers information that can increase the efficiency of estimation. Accordingly, we propose to estimate a system of four seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE)
15
in which the dependent variables are federal-government final-consumption-expenditure as 14 We emphasize again that we consider this empirical evaluation highly preliminary. In future work, we hope to leverage Levitt and Snyder's (1995) idea of using cross-district variation in disbursement to identify porkier budgetary categories and Hird's (1991) approach to estimating the over-(i.e., inefficient) spending. 15 The Beck-Katz (1995, 1998) criticism of the Parks procedure for estimating equations from pooled time-series-cross-section data applies here also; we will effectively have 4 time-series equations estimated in parallel. However, with 4 equations and 39 observations each, T here is almost 10 times the equivalent to N.
Thus, feasible generalized least squares, in this case SURE, should provide bona fide, not misleading, smaller standard-errors.
shares of (i) GDP and of (ii) federal-government expenditures, and federal-government nontransfers spending as shares (iii) of GDP and of (iv) federal-government expenditures. All data are annual and taken from the University of Michigan's Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics 16 .
Next we consider the strong serial correlation of these dependent variables and the possibility of unit roots. For each variable, first-order correlation far exceeds 0.9, so, given the sample size, none rejects unit-root tests. An error-correction format therefore seems appropriate (Beck 1992), and, in our models, the format accommodates serial correlation and allays unit-root concerns adequately. Error-correction models regress changes in the dependent variable on (i) its lagged level plus any lagged changes the data suggest are necessary to model serial correlation, (ii) lagged levels of each independent variable theory suggests as a potential cointegrating factor, and (iii) any changes in the independent variable theory suggests. In this format, coefficients on changes represent momentum-like relationships between independent-variable changes and dependent-variable changes; coefficients on lagged levels represent equilibrium-like relationships between levels of the independent and dependent variables. In the usual dynamic-equation fashion, both propagate through the dependent variable over time as the estimated coefficients on lagged dependent-variable levels and changes dictate. Having no strong priors on the momentum or equilibrium nature of the spending effects of our theoretical and control variables, we enter all variables in contemporaneous differences and in lagged levels.
Finally, we need an appropriate set of controls. Obviously, public spending will respond to economic conditions regardless of constituency conditions fostering distributive politics. from IMF sources 18 ). Similarly, spending may respond to government ideology (Hibbs 1977) and/or to the incentive to manipulate the economy for pre-electoral purposes (Tufte 1978 ), so we also include a pre-electoral indicator (ELE) 19 and a control for the left-right partisan "center-of-gravity" of the US government (CoG).
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In error-correction form, then, each seemingly-unrelated-regression equation (SURE) reads: that year. That measure is the core of our empirical exercise, and we expect, following our augmented WSJ model, that its coefficients will be positive in each equation. By measuring the effective number of constituencies before and outside estimation of these empirical models, we set the null hypothesis as that this measure relates (positively) to spending and as alternative merely that it does not. A more direct and revealing test would allow the data to adjudicate whether numbers of governmental parties and of electoral districts affect spending in the manner hypothesized, i.e., in a convex combination with weight a function of party unity, against a stronger alternative that these factors might affect spending linearly additively or not at all (as, e.g., Franzese 1999 Franzese , 2002 Franzese , 2003 do in monetary-policy contexts). However, as noted, US electoral-district numbers do not vary and governmental parties numbers hardly vary in our sample, offering very little empirical leverage for such more-direct and -powerful empirical evaluation of our argument: another key reason we view these results as highly preliminary.
As argued, the effective constituency to which a particular representative responds is some convex combination of her legislatively exhibited allegiance to her party and to residents of her electoral district. Thus, for an individual representative, the effective constituency is given by c = u · p + (1 − u) · d, where u measures her party loyalty, p represents her partisan constituency, and d her electoral-district constituency. Generalizing from here to the effective number of constituencies represented by many legislators, i.e., summing over all representatives, the formula remains unchanged, except that p becomes the number of parties and d the number of electoral districts in the political system. Specifically for the US case, our measure of the effective number of constituencies, EN oC, is therefore given by:
where U JK = party unity amongst House or Senate (J = H, S) Democrats or Republicans (K = D, R) 21 and N j k is the number of House or Senate Democrats or Republicans. The formula assumes the House and Senate equally important in policymaking and that the president's effective number of constituencies is fixed and so may be ignored.
22 Thus, the numbers of constituencies in the House and Senate average to produce the effective number in the US political system. We can modify these simplifying assumptions if that proves theoretically or empirically necessary.
We thus divide US effective constituencies into 4 sets: effective House Republican and Democratic and Senate Republican and Democratic constituencies. For each legislator, the level of party unity serves to weigh the degree to which her district-or her partisanconstituents' interests govern her behavior. Therefore, the higher the party unity, the fewer the constituencies because legislators appeal more to broadly-based ideological constituencies along party lines than to localistic interests of their electoral district. Conversely, leaders that use pork-barrel projects for their own individual district are, ipso facto, less responsive to their partisan and more responsive to their geographic constituency.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE. Figure 3 plots the resulting series, EN oC, revealing a notable upward-then-downward trend. The numbers of parties and electoral districts barely change in this period, so the pattern reflects a decline then rise in legislative party-unity. Peak party-disunity and so peak effective-constituency numbers occur in the mid-to-late 1960s, and both return to 1950 levels by 1990. If our re-conceptualized WSJ model is correct, distributive politics and spending 21 We use the party unity scores calculated and published by The CQ Almanac. Accordingly, party unity is measured as "the percentage of Party Unity Votes on which a representative voted 'yea' or 'nay' in agreement with a majority of her party," where a Party Unity Vote is a vote in the Senate or House that splits the parties, a majority of voting Democrats opposing a majority of voting Republicans. 22 Although senators number two per state, each delegation represents only one constituency (i.e., the state), so the number of senators for each party divided by two is the number of constituencies represented.
In future work, presidents may enter EN oC by weighted-averaging (2) with another term representing the number of presidential constituencies (to be determined) and a weight given by the policy efficacy of the president.
should similarly rise then decline.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. Table 1 summarizes the estimation results. In all equations, the coefficients on changes and levels of EN oC are positive, as hypothesized, and the level/equilibrium relationship is significant at minimally the p < 0.06 level. The change/momentum and level/equilibrium effects both obtain high significance in the final-consumption-as-a-share-of-GDP equation. Table 2 
Conclusions
While we view the evidence above as far more suggestive than conclusive, our conceptualization of the effective number of constituencies seems, at the least, to have provided a means to test the WSJ model directly for the US case. The evidence from the postwar history of US fiscal policy seems to support the argument and suggests that as much as a quarter of the rising-then-falling path of US federal government final-consumption might be attributable to a parallel path in the effective number of constituencies, which, in turn, stemmed from a mirror-image decline then rise in legislative party unity. However, the argument and evidence above also suggest that the effective-constituencies concept in general and, more narrowly, the argument relating it to distributive politics and pork-barrel spending might be usefully extended in several theoretically interesting and important ways.
First, we conceptualized the effective constituency to which policymakers respond as a simple continuum from geographic representation of electoral districts at most disaggregated to partisan representation of the sets of interests supporting political parties at most aggregated. One may alternatively conceive the endeavor as our attempt to describe the dimensions of the possible bases of democratic representation. From that broader view, we have spanned partisan and geographic bases but may have omitted others such as functional, identity, interest, or social-cleavage representation. We suspect our partisan endpoint covers many of these; i.e., we view partisan representatives as serving the set of interests that support their party, which may subsume interest and social groups. The sufficiency of a uni-dimensional continuum, though, is an empirical matter. Representatives may, e.g., represent
certain industrial interests in a way that cross-sects rather than reflects their partisan affiliations. For example, much comparative-politics research has suggested that corporatist bases of representation pervade many developed democracies (e.g., Berger 1984; Lijphart1974, 1975 Lijphart1974, , 1977 Lijphart1974, , 1984 see Gallagher et al. 1995: ch. 14 and Lane and Ersson 1994: ch. 7 for textbook review).
Our convex-combination approach remains useful in testing such propositions, e.g., that
industrial sectors act as bases of representation distinct from partisanship and geography.
In that case, we would advise first estimating the effective number of industries (i) in the political economy using some standard approach: e.g., i = ( j z 2 j ) −1 where z j is the j th industry's share of employment or output. Then, the effective number of constituencies, c, would be given, as before, by some convex combination of the numbers of parties, p, of electoral districts, d, and, now, also of industrial sectors, i. Again, a linear weighted-average would be simplest, but party unity, u, no longer suffices to give the weight. Substantively, one possibility would be to adopt some measure from the literature of the degree of corporatist representation, cr, in a society; our concept of the effective constituency, c, then extends
Another possibility would be to estimate a country-by-country constrained nonlinear least-squares regression of some distributiveactivity measure on effective numbers of constituencies entered thus: and geographic representation, respectively, in that country. 23 Also,
is the estimated degree of party unity in the country assuming the causal role attributed to party unity here is correct. This approach effectively assumes the degrees to which representation operates in 23 Just as one could replace the one linear weight in the two-bases-of-representation case with logit or probit functions to confine those weights to the unit interval, one could replace the pair of weights in this three-bases case with the corresponding multinomial logit or probit function to confine those weights to the unit simplex.
various forms and of party unity (i.e., a, b, and 1 − a − b) are some country-specific constants to be estimated. Alternatively, one could model a and b theoretically as suggested in Section 3. Such a project remains for future research, but the discussion hopefully amply illustrates the potential for usefully extending the effective constituency concept.
The argument and evidence presented here suggest still further considerations related to the effective number of constituencies in general and/or to the political economy of distributive politics and pork-barrel spending in particular. In section three, we acknowledged that lesser partisan polarization and greater district-level electoral-competitiveness were likely to increase the relative prominence of distributive politics and spending. We would now add that aggregate-level electoral competitiveness, characteristics of the electoral system, and the number and relative importance of various levels of government (national, regional, local, etc.) may play a role as well.
Holding constant the number of parties and of electoral districts, and the degrees of party unity, polarization, and district-level electoral-competitiveness; electoral competitiveness at the national level likely increases distributive spending as well. Consider, again, two hypothetical UKs, alike in all the above respects; assume specifically that each electoral district is expected to produce a 55 − 45 split in the next election. In one UK, though, all the 55 − 45 splits favor Labour, and, in the other UK, half favor Labour and half favor Tories. The marginal value to the incumbent of district projects is much greater in the second UK, and so we should expect greater distributive politics and spending there. The logic is a simple extension of Tufte (1978) and follows directly from Schultz's (1995) demonstration of a similar effect in actual UK data, namely that pre-electoral manipulation of transfer payments occurs only to the degree the coming election is expected to be close. Empirical exploration of this hypothesis, relating it specifically to distributive politics and spending, awaits future research.
Furthermore, Carey and Shugart (1995) summarize the incentives deriving from the electoral system for representatives to cultivate a personal vote, which here would imply greater emphasis on district-oriented distributive politics, by four aspects of the system: (i) partyleader control over the ballot, (ii) vote pooling, (iii) type and number of multiple votes, and (iv) district magnitude.
24 Once again, one can model u in our effective constituency concept to reflect these arguments directly (see Section 3), and one might do so to extend this project comparatively.
The number and relative importance of various levels of government clearly enter as well. In a federal system, e.g., two considerations suggest that the decentralization of fiscal decision-making to provincial government might mitigate the tendency toward over-emphasis of district-level projects hypothesized by WSJ. First, especially if federalism comes with a transferal of some revenue-generation authority to the sub-national governments, decentralized decision-making may reduce the effective fiscal authorities' ability to externalize the costs of their locally desired spending to larger, aggregate decision-making units. At the regional level, the degree to which benefits can concentrated relative to costs diminishes simply because regions are smaller, both geographically and in terms of the diversity of interests they encompass. Second, such decentralized fiscal-decision-making may lead to a "race to the bottom" as localities compete for investment by lowering taxes (Peterson 1990) . I.e., whatever the impact of decentralized fiscal-decision-making on the WSJ problem, it also introduces a prisoners'-dilemma dynamic among the regions which operates in the other direction, toward reducing distributive over-spending. 25 However, federalism might also raise the prominence of local relative to national concerns among the electorate and, thereby, among policymakers. If so, the impact of federalism on distributive politics and spending could easily be positive. Even in unitary systems, one can distinguish between stronger unitary-states in which few political decisions occur at the local level and weaker ones in which much political activity is local, including in the weakest cases considerable revenue-generation. One might well expect the relative weight of distributive politics and, thereby, distributive spending to 24 On the last, see also (Long 2003) and the discussion in Section 3. 25 Sharpe (1988) argues to the contrary, though, that spending increases with decentralization because, he contends, resistance to tax increases is lower at the sub-national than the national level.
rise the weaker the central state in this respect. These considerations, and the question of how they interact, remain open issues.
In conclusion, one advantage of our effective-constituency concept lies in expanding the theoretical and empirical scope of the WSJ logic of 1 n in distributive politics and spending, as shown in the first part of our paper. Beyond that, however, we believe the theoretical and empirical potential of the effective constituency concept extends well beyond this preliminary exposition and evidence to set an interesting, and what we hope is a fruitful, agenda for future research into how the competitiveness and the institutions and structure of electoral competition affect the capacity of democratic policymakers to budgeteer, the magnitude of their incentives to do so, and the nature, redistributive vs. distributive, of those incentives. 
